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Abstract
Since their inception, implicit attitudes have been defined as associative mental states, separate
from beliefs, which are considered to be propositional in nature. Recently, several philosophers
have challenged this distinction, arguing that implicit attitudes are actually unconscious beliefs.
In turn, I argue that the attitudes detected by current experimental paradigms are blind to
distinctions between implicit attitudes, which I define as the products of an associative learning
mechanism, and unconscious beliefs, which are the products of a propositional learning
mechanism. Specifically, I argue for a single-representational dual-attitude account of implicit
bias.
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Section 1. Introduction

The term ‘implicit bias’ was first introduced in the psychological literature in 1995 by
social psychologists Mahzarin Banaji and Tony Greenwald (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995).
Originally focused on implicit social cognition, the term has come to refer to a host of
unconscious processes capable of facilitating downstream effects on judgment and behavior. A
recent compendium of implicit bias defines the phenomenon as the “relatively unconscious and
relatively automatic features of prejudiced judgment and social behavior.”1 For example, a hiring
manager with a commitment to meritocracy may nevertheless, upon inspection, have a history of
hiring only those applicants with Western names. Interviewees with appellations outside this
category (Taj, Allegra, Kahdijah) are at a decided disadvantage for employment, though this fact
may be lost on both themselves and their interviewer. In this case, it might be said that the
interviewer has an implicit bias towards foreigners; or, alternatively, that the interviewer
possesses an implicit attitude against foreigners. While often used interchangeably, the former
term is preferred when stressing agent-level actions and the latter when indicating the mental
content responsible – either in whole or in part – for a biased action. Notwithstanding the most
ardent dispositionalist, this subtle distinction ought to be acceptable to most philosophers,
regardless of their doxastic commitments. Moving forward, I will use implicit bias when
speaking of the actions and consequences of individual/group behavior, and implicit attitude
when discussing the representational state of a mental item implicated in prejudiced actions.
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See Michael Brownstein, “Implicit Bias,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta
(https://plato.stanford.educ/archives/spr2017/entries/implicit-bias/).
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With this distinction underfoot, we are free to ask: why should philosophers be interested
in implicit bias? First, the harms of implicit biases are self-evident. For instance, Hoffman and
colleagues found that black Americans are undertreated for pain when compared to their white
counterparts (Hoffman et al., 2016). Faculty members from psychology departments around the
country – which are chiefly liberal (Buss & von Hippel, 2018) – rate the same CV as stronger
when it is accompanied by a typical male, rather than female, name (Steinpries, Anders, and
Ritzke, 1999). While inadequate pain treatment and employment challenges are concerning in
themselves, the infamous ‘Weapon Bias’ study reveals that subjects are much more likely to
perceive someone as carrying a weapon when they are black as opposed to white (Payne et al.,
2001). Even more disturbing, participants in a fast-paced virtual simulation are much more apt to
‘shoot’ an armed subject if he is perceived as black, and contra positively, participants are much
quicker to ‘not shoot’ a subject perceived as white (Correll et al., 2002). The continued shootings
of unarmed black men by police in America underscores the fact that there is, unfortunately, a
very real connection between how a person behaves in an experimental setting and their behavior
in real-world situations (Banaji and Greenwald, 2013).

In addition to these cases, where the harm to targets of implicit bias is readily apparent,
there are many subtle ways in which discriminatory behavior can flourish without attracting
attention. This is most clearly evinced in cases of microaggression, where the verbal and
behavioral interactions between persons is mediated by certain social facts (e.g. race, gender,
age, weight, and so on), but whose harm is masked by the inconspicuous manner in which it
unfolds. Consider the elderly white woman who clutches her purse as she passes a black man
(Sue et al., 2007), the male Supreme Court member who incessantly interrupts his female

2

colleague (Jacobi & Schweers, 2017), or skeptical questions from students about their racialized
instructor’s ability to teach English (Ramjattan, 2019). The prevalence of these subtle
discriminations can continually chip away at the well-being and self-esteem of individuals while
operating under the guise of conventional behavior and accepted social norms, ultimately
culminating in a ‘death by a thousand cuts.’ No wonder, then, that victims of microaggressions
are liable to lash out a perceived slight or unwitting refrain, much to the consternation of the
individual whose action is by all appearances (except the target’s) a minor infraction.

Secondly, social psychologists have provided ample evidence that people can sometimes
behave in ways that challenge their expressed beliefs and preferences, as in the case of our
‘meritocratic’ interviewer. This divergence between word and action is so pronounced that even
staunch egalitarians can behave in ways diametrically opposed to their avowed commitments to
social equality and fairness (De Houwer et al., 2009). This disparity between the conscious-level
beliefs of an agent (including hypothetical beliefs, like what they would do in situation X) and
their actual behavior is troubling from both an epistemic and moral perspective.2 The actions of
an agent who professes to believe that all people are to be treated equally without regard to
feature F, yet behaves in a systematically biased manner towards people with F, is susceptible to
questions regarding their sincerity, rationality, and moral acumen.

To help make sense of these inconsistencies, psychologists have coined the terms
‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ to refer to the functional and structural differences between attitudes.
While there are many usages of the term attitude, the ABC model of attitudes (Affect, Behavior,
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For discussion of the epistemic threat of implicit biases, see: (Gendler, 2011; Saul, 2013a, 2013b; Peters, 2018;
Puddifoot, 2017).

3

and Cognition) has gained prominence in recent years (Solomon, 2008).3 This view states that
every attitude will have an affective, behavioral, and cognitive component, which can cohere or
conflict to varying degrees; this is seen as an improvement over the classic model proposed by
Rosenburg and Hovland (1960), which required each portion of an attitude to scrupulously align.
According to the ABC model, the affective component of an attitude exemplifies one’s feelings
or emotions towards an object – e.g. I am afraid of snakes. The behavioral aspect of the theory
details the effects our attitudes have on our actions – e.g. I will flee if I see a snake.4 And finally,
the cognitive component of an attitude is determined by an agent’s knowledge or beliefs about an
object – e.g. I believe snakes are a threat.

The dominant view within psychology holds that implicit attitudes are unconscious,
associative, and acquired within the context of an agent’s particular learning history (Levy, 2015,
p. 803). These associations are the result of repeated pairings between a representation and a
particular evaluative response (good, bad, deceitful, polite, etc.). For instance, continued
exposure to hateful rhetoric and sensational media can create an association between the concept
IMMIGRANT and the negative evaluations (bad, dangerous, etc.) used to describe or reference
migrant groups. This can manifest in a host of biased behaviors, from decreased eye contact
(Dovidio et al., 1997) to an inability to find adequate housing (Ahmed and Hammarstedht, 2008)
and employment (Bendick et al., 2010). Some go further and distinguish implicit cognitive
attitudes, which are propositionally structured mental representations, from implicit affective
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For instance, in Chapter XI of Psychological Types (1932), Carl Jung broadly defines an attitude as ‘a readiness of
the psyche to act or react in a certain way’.
4
Knowledge of what one will do when confronted with a stimulus or state of affairs is not necessary for the
behavioral component of the ABC theory. What is necessary for an action or response to qualify as behavior is a
relatively stable reaction to stimuli under similar conditions.
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attitudes, which are stereotypical input-output relations realized in one’s valuational mechanisms
(Carruthers, 2018).

The most famous method for measuring unconscious bias is the implicit association test;
henceforth, IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).5 The IAT measures response times of participants
when pairing images with words. The terminology chosen for these tasks are affectively-laden
and/or can be used to form a stereotypical coupling (ASIAN + INTELLIGENT). For example, in
a standard race IAT, a subject is presented with an image of a white or black face and asked to
sort positively and negatively valanced words with the image. Someone with an implicit bias will
perform better when the task demand accords with stereotypical classifications and slower when
asked to classify pairings that defy those stereotypes. The difference in response times and
accuracy between stereotypical and non-stereotypical pairings is due to the effort it takes to
inhibit the automatically generated response that this concept goes with this word. Someone
without an implicit bias will exhibit similar speed and accuracy regardless of whether the task
demand accords with social stereotypes or not.

Explicit attitudes refer to the mental states an agent is consciously aware of. These
attitudes are typically viewed as propositional in nature, making them sensitive to evidence and
logical relations, as well as the constituents of conscious thought. The standard approach for
identifying a subject’s explicit attitudes are via verbal reports. Though vulnerable to regulated
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Other methods include the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne & Lundberg 2014); the Sorting Paired
Feature Task (SPFT; Bar-Anan, et al. 2009); and the Weapon Identification Task (Payne 2001). For our purposes,
we will focus on IAT experiments because they have been the most heavily researched.
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responses and self-deception, psychologists are careful to control for these variables when
designing and administering their experiments.

Surprisingly, some research suggests that implicit attitudes are a better predictor of
behavior than explicit attitudes, reinforcing the aforementioned epistemic threat (Greenwald et
al., 2009). Other studies question this assertion, with one major meta-analysis reporting little
correlation between implicitly biased behavior within the lab and actions without (Oswald et al.,
2013). Neil Levy (2015) questions the efficacy of these findings, citing various meta-analyses
currently underway with preliminary reports showing stronger correlations than what Oswald et
al. found in their experimental matrix. Nevertheless, even if implicit bias turns out to be a rare
occurrence and the claims of Greenwald and colleagues unwarranted, the fact remains that a
single instance of implicit bias has the potential to drastically alter, or end, a person’s life.

The implicit/explicit distinction remains the dominant view in psychology and has been
warmly received by philosophers in favor of dual process theories of mind (DPT). Dual process
theory posits two different modes of cognitive processing: ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ (e.g., Evans
and Stanovich, 2013) or alternatively, ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ (e.g., Frankish, 2010;
Kahneman, 2012; Sloman, 2014).6 The functional differences between these two groups of
processes is often represented using contrastive pairings, such as slow/fast, effortless/effortful,
evolutionarily old/evolutionarily recent, and so on. While I formally endorse DPT as the best
framework in which to examine implicit attitudes, it is likely that many of the sharp distinctions

6

System, here, refers not to a single cognitive mechanism but a diverse range of cognitive processes with similar
functional traits. For instance, the mechanisms which compose our auditory and visual processes are specialized
networks with little, if any, overlap; nevertheless, each would be classified as a System 1 process in virtue of being
automatically activated and introspectively opaque.
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that such pairings suggest are more fluid in nature. Indeed, some of the studies we will discuss in
this work point to sophisticated interactions between Type 1 and Type 2 processes, a fact which
ought to give pause to those that wish to divide the mind into neat categories. Following Nick
Byrd, I will refer to these two cognitive systems as Non-reflective and Reflective (Byrd, 2018).
One motivation for adopting these monikers in an already terminologically-laden field is that
should future research challenge some of the sharp distinctions that typify DPT, the proposed
division can be maintained by appealing to either system’s relation to higher order cognition. For
instance, in response to recent criticism, several philosophers have provided persuasive evidence
of a perception/cognition border (Burge, 2010; Block, 2014; Firestone and Scholl, 2014;
Mandelbaum, 2018); if substantiated, such a border indicates a delineation between conscious
thought (Reflective) and those processes that operate automatically, are grounded in modular
systems, and are relatively encapsulated from top-down influences (Non-Reflective). A recurrent
question in this work is whether the operations of a mental representation are due to
architectural/structural limitations or extrinsic factors, such as interactions with other mental
contents. By the end, I hope to show that an appeal to structural limitations can help us delineate
between the functional capacities of implicit attitudes and doxastic states.

Moving forward, I adopt Sophie Stammers’ four couplets to frame my discussion of how
DPT relates to conventional distinctions between implicit and explicit attitudes (Stammers,
2017). I align these couplets under the Non-Reflective/Reflective distinction to keep in mind the
relation these processes have to higher-order thought:

7

Non-Reflective
Reflective
(a) Unconscious
(a1) Conscious
(b) Associatively Structured
(b1) Propositionally Structured
(c) Automatically Activated
(c1) Deliberately Controlled
(d) Not avowed
(d1) Avowed
Figure 1. Four distinctive features of dual-process theory

Recall our ‘meritocratic’ interviewer. Her belief in the ideal that ‘The best person gets the
job” meets propositions a1…d1, but her behavior is inconsistent with this belief, and operates in
an unconscious and systematically biased manner towards a certain group of people – those with
non-Western names. Here, the dual-process theorist posits that the output of the interviewer’s
non-reflective processes, whatever they may be, are in conflict with the outputs of her reflective
processes.7 Given that the woman’s bias is (a) unconscious, (b) acquired in an associative
manner, (c) activated automatically and immune to top-down suppression, and (d) consciously
disavowed, then the bias is implicit in nature, caused via non-reflective processes, and in
contention with the woman’s reflectively endorsed attitudes. Endorsing a dual-attitudinal account
of mind equips us with the structural framework needed to make recurrent clashes between
attitudes (and other mental representations) intelligible: there are two functionally distinct
systems whose outputs conflict along several cognitive dimensions, only one of which enjoys
access to conscious awareness.

The outline of this work is as follows. Section two has four aims: (1) introduce the dualmechanism theory of implicit bias, (2) clarify the role of top-down attention in the formation of

7

A caveat is in order. Most of our explicit and implicit attitudes align, as in the case of a vitriolic vegan possessing
both: a) explicitly negative beliefs and attitudes about meat-eaters, and b) implicitly negative attitudes against meateaters and their ilk. The interesting cases are when the two diverge, as when a social egalitarian learns they are
implicitly biased against a certain social group.
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subliminal associations, (3) present a leading theory of consciousness that helps establish the
functional profile of implicit/explicit attitudes, and (4) defend the distinction between implicit
attitudes and unconscious beliefs. Section three assesses several of the leading implicit attitude
studies through the lens of dual-mechanism theory, and argues against the idea that implicit
attitudes might constitute a unique mental state distinct from associations or beliefs. Section four
examines the implications that a resurgence in associative research has for discussions of implicit
bias. And section five concludes this work with a suggestion for future empirical studies into the
nature of implicit attitudes, as well as applications for dual-mechanism theory.

Section 2. Dual-Processes and Multiple Learning Mechanisms

There are currently four attitude models that employ the terms implicit and explicit in
different ways. Because these models vary in terminology and conceptual commitments,
philosophers writing on implicit attitudes ought to be clear as to which framework they adopt
and the reasons motivating their endorsement. First, some have argued that the two terms track
distinct mental representations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2000). Alternatively,
some use the distinction solely in reference to attitude measurements, thereby remaining agnostic
towards the representational status of any underlying mental state (Fazio, 2007; Petty et al.,
2009). A third approach distinguishes attitudes via the processes they feature in, and admits of
single, dual, and multi-process views (De Houwer et al., 2009). And finally, the terms have been
used to capture significant differences in a person’s evaluative responses (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011).

9

In addition to this dispute, there is disagreement over what mental items the
association/proposition distinction is meant to track. They can refer, alternatively, to the learning
mechanism that encodes an attitude in memory, the resulting mental representation, or the
processes by which an attitude manifests in behavior (Gawronski et al., 2017). Endorsing the
second psychological model and referring to associative or propositional processes would shift
the discussion of implicit biases into the world of behavior – welcome territory for those wishing
to address the problems of implicit bias without endorsing particular claims about the
representational or functional status of attitudes. Such a maneuver would look very different
from someone who championed the first attitude model and the third associative/propositional
pair – a representationalist view of belief with specific cognitive commitments – whose work
would primarily focus on providing empirical evidence of distinct mental representations and
separate memory stores.

I endorse a dual-process version of the third attitude model and use the terms associative
and propositional to refer to two distinct learning mechanisms within the brain. Specifically, I
present a single-representational dual-attitude account, which holds that all attitudes are similarly
structured and stored in a shared memory format, but are disposed to feature in either automatic
or deliberate processes. As we shall see, the rigid distinctions imposed by traditional versions of
DPT are flaunted by evidence of propositional attitudes featuring in automatic processes.
Findings such as these encourage a soft version of DPT, where the processes and mechanisms
which have historically been associated with one categorical attitude can interact under certain
circumstances. To justify these claims, I now turn to a recent meta-analysis that assessed the
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performance of the four attitude models in relation to the last thirty years of evaluative
conditioning (EC) research (Corneille & Stahl, 2019).

Evaluative conditioning can be understood as the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus
(CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US) (De Houwer,
2007). A good example is the picture-picture paradigm, which repeatedly pairs a subjectively
neutral picture of a human face (the CS) with a subjectively liked or disliked face (the US) until
the affective qualities of the latter bind to the former (Baeyens et al., 1992). Understanding the
state of affairs within EC research is important, since it provides “…the strongest support for the
existence of an associative attitude learning process…” (Corneille & Stahl, 2019, p. 162).

The results of their meta-analysis found that no single attitude model could address the
diversity of complex and sometimes contradictory findings within EC research, however, a
rendition of the third model – De Houwer’s propositional approach to attitude learning (PAL)
(De Houwer, 2009) – faired best. According to this theory, all instances of associative
conditioning are best explained by the formation of propositional mental constructs, an idea
which undercuts over a century of associative research.8 For De Houwer, a proposition about a
stimulus relation is best understood as “…a mental representation that contains information
about the nature of the relation between stimuli (e.g. A predicts B, A causes B, A co-occurs with
B) (De Houwer, 2018, p. 3). As such, there are no ‘associations’ in the normal sense of the word.
Because propositions can record mere co-occurrences as well as more specific relational
information, the need for an associative learning mechanism or other such mental process is

8

This is an application of Mitchell and colleagues’ (2009) broader claim that all instances of learning in humans is
propositional in nature.
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rendered obsolete. This makes PAL a single-process account of attitudes, where the process
responsible for producing all attitudes in human cognition is a single propositional learning
mechanism. Unfortunately, there is currently no method for determining whether or not an
attitude possesses a purely associative structure, as most psychologists contend, or a
propositionally structured recording of a mere contiguous relation.9 As such, purveyors of the
field are tasked with assessing how well an attitude model conforms to empirical findings in a
parsimonious manner.

Another central claim of PAL is that in order for specific relational information to be
recorded, an agent must be consciously aware of the subsequent stimuli, events, or concepts
involved. More precisely, “…it is assumed that a relation in the world can influence behavior
only after a proposition about that relation has been consciously entertained as being true.” (De
Houwer, 2018, p. 6). The necessity of conscious awareness in the formation of propositional
structures is supported by evidence of single-instruction attitude formation (Gast & De Houwer,
2013; Smith et al., 2013) and the fact that implicit evaluation is moderated by relational
information, as evinced by implicit evaluation change in participants given affective-laden
descriptions of strangers (Peters & Gawronski, 2011). Moreover, there is strong evidence that
propositional structures can be formed and stored in memory at dizzying speeds (De Houwer,
2014), which ought to comfort those who think awareness is too severe a limitation to account

9

Problems of falsifiability are a common trend amongst attitudinal models. Both De Houwer’s propositional
approach to attitude learning (PAL) and Gawronski & Bodenhausen’s associative-propositional evaluation (APE)
model cannot be falsified by current psychological paradigms (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2018; De Houwer,
2018). This is in large part due to the difficulty of discerning whether A co-occurs with B is merely a contiguous
relation between stimuli or the propositionally structured recording of a contiguous relation.
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for the rapid construction of attitudes.10 As it stands, PAL offers doxastic accounts of implicit
bias a sound theoretical model for why implicit attitudes are unconscious beliefs: simply put, all
attitudes are the result of a single-propositional mechanism (De Houwer, 2014).

Moving forward, I provide evidence against a single-process account of attitudes and
address some of the concerns of Corneille and Stahl’s (2019) meta-analysis. In doing so, I argue
that there are two separate learning mechanisms in the brain: an associative/non-propositional
learning mechanism and one that is propositional in nature. Associative mental states have
traditionally been cast as the internal representation of an external contiguous relation, thereby
accounting for their insensitivity to logical relations and inferential patterns. Attitudes resulting
from a propositional learning mechanism, in contrast, are encoded with precise relational
information over their relata, and exhibit an unparalleled ability to commingle with other mental
states, feature in inferences, and operate in accordance with the laws of logic. The next section
articulates one way in which associative mental links can operate beyond mere contiguity,
despite upholding a sharp distinction between the inferential promiscuity of associative and
propositional states.

2.1 The Role of Top-Down Attention in Associative Conditioning

PAL states that all propositional learning, including associative conditioning, requires
conscious awareness (Hughes et al., 2011). For information to be stored in a propositional
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This is one such example of the fluidity of traditional DPT pairings. Propositional structures are usually associated
with deliberate thought, and the fact that they can feature in – in fact, even be formed by – automatic processes
threatens rigid distinctions between Type 1 and Type 2 processes.
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format, the higher-order processes which accompany conscious thought must identify the
relation that holds over stimuli and concepts.11 This strong requirement creates a link between
awareness and sophisticated mental recordings, such that subliminal conditioning of any kind
ought to be physically impossible within a mental architecture solely designed to process and
produce propositionally structured mental representations. Motivated by debates between
associative and propositional models, Custers and Aarts (2011) set out to test whether or not
predictive relations of unidirectional associations could be formed in the absence of conscious
awareness. Associations can be formed in a bi-directional manner, where perceiving either of
two events brings the other to mind, or in a unidirectional manner, where noticing E1 evokes E2,
but not vice versa. Predictive relations refer to the stored knowledge of how two or more events
relate to one another, e.g. E1 consistently precedes E2. Because unidirectional associations
capture important relational information, these mental constructs are typically seen as requiring
conscious attention, and would be classified as propositional according to De Houwer’s inclusive
notion of propositionality.

The results of their three-part study indicate that unidirectional associations can be
formed in the absence of conscious awareness so long as attention is ‘tuned’ to process
predictive relations. In experiment one, participants were split into two groups: group one was
primed to process predictive relations before participating in the acquisition phase of the
experiment, whereas group two directly entered the latter phase. Priming was achieved by asking
participants to quickly sort two targets (a circle or triangle) whose classification could be

11

For an explanation of how a purely propositional structure could account for the dizzying speeds of automatic
processes, see De Houwer (2014). In short, while conscious awareness is necessary to kickstart many of these
automatic processes, it has little to do with the implementation of those processes.
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predicted by a subtle cue. As hypothesized, those in the priming condition were statistically more
likely to form unidirectional associations despite not being consciously aware of the predictive
cues. This suggests that top-down attentional processes track relations between stimuli and
concepts, and govern the storage of relational information independently of conscious awareness.

One of the main criticisms of Corneille & Stahl’s (2019) meta-analysis was the quality of
evidence for subliminally acquired EC. While there are many studies supporting the idea that
evaluative associations can be acquired without conscious awareness, Corneille and Stahl note
that these experiments often fail to ensure that conscious awareness is properly masked or
otherwise re-directed from predictive cues. If a CS-US pair is consciously apprehended, even
tangentially, then this could account for any subsequent conditioning. In fact, this is precisely
what PAL suggests: noticing a predictive cue would be enough to trigger storage of the relation,
even if the cue was not ascertained as a cue by the subject or was subsequently forgotten due to
top-down processes failing to store the information. This means that the vast majority of
evidence for unconscious EC is dubious at best.

To avoid these criticisms, experiments two and three implemented a pre-mask to prevent
any awareness of predictive cues. As in the first experiment, participants whose top-down
processes were unconsciously primed to track predictive relations were much more likely to
form unidirectional associations in the second phase, providing striking evidence of unconscious
conditioning. This suggests that the criticisms levied by Corneille and Stahl against subliminal
associative acquisition may be due to a conflation of conscious awareness with top-down
attention. As many theorists have argued, these two facilities are dissociable, and may play
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different roles in learning (Baars, 1997; Dehaene et al., 2006; Lamme, 2003; Koch & Tsuchiya,
2007. In fact, Custers and Aarts dispute some of the findings that Corneille and Stahl use to base
their critique of subliminal EC precisely on these grounds.12

Together, these findings support the idea that attention-tuning can occur independently of
conscious awareness and that top-down processes govern the storage of predictive relations in
memory. How damaging are these findings to PAL? In a forthcoming book chapter, De Houwer
acknowledges the weight of this evidence leaves the single-process propositional theorist with
two options: 1) concede that a second non-propositional mechanism produces certain instances
of associative learning, or 2) drop the assumption that propositional models must be entertained
consciously before they can influence behavior (De Houwer, forthcoming, p. 11). Option two is
an ad-hoc assumption and contradicts one of the main tenets of PAL, so barring any future
findings, De Houwer grants that there are likely two separate learning mechanisms responsible
for the production of attitudes.

2.2 Implications for the Class of Implicit Attitudes

The existence of two learning mechanisms marks dual-process theories as the best
psychological model to evaluate implicit attitudes. But as we have seen, how we define relevant
terminology can hinder our evaluation of the desired mental phenomena. By defining
propositionality as the recording of any relation between stimuli or concepts, De Houwer cannot
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In particular, Custers and Aarts dispute the findings of Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, and Yzerbyt (2007). Since the
domain of top-down attention exceeds that of conscious awareness, future arguments against subliminal
conditioning should focus on clarifying the role of top-down awareness in implicit learning.
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account for instances of subliminal conditioning without abandoning the idea that propositional
encoding requires conscious awareness. But evidence of subliminal unidirectional associations
suggest that associatively linked mental constructs can record more than just contiguous
relations, indicating that associations, as a class, can possess a range of specificity over their
relata. While likely not very large, this range still establishes satisfaction conditions for
associatively structured mental states.

A unidirectional association between events E1 and E2 ensures that a primitive causal
connection holds between the perception of E1 and the associatively evoked E2. The associative
link will respond to the appropriate stimuli presented in the format A à B, but not to the same
stimuli presented as B à A. Bi-directional associations, on the other hand, are blind to the
logical implications of their relata, activating the other member of an associative link when either
of the two is perceived. What we have, then, is an associative link that operates over and above
the Hebbian principle fire together, wire together. Unidirectional associations are not merely the
representation of contiguous stimulus pairings, but specific renditions of an environmental
regularity, one that accords with a predictive principle that furthers an organism’s ability to
navigate its surroundings. The interaction between bottom-up processes (which supply
information) and top-down attentional processes (which allocate mental resources and governs
the storage of information) allows for the specification of conceptual relations over associatively
linked mental states. These links are more sophisticated than their bi-directional counterparts, yet
still fall far short of the kind of inferential promiscuity characteristic of beliefs.
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According to De Houwer, for a representation to be propositionally structured just is for
that representation to possess relational information over its relata. Having such information
means that a representation is more than a reflection of external regularities, indeed, it is
sensitive to logical and semantic considerations (Mandelbaum, 2013). Specifying the relation
between two or more concepts signifies that a representation is making a statement about the
world, and such statements are subject to accuracy conditions; the relation A à B can be true,
false, or possess some degree of predictive accuracy. Top-down attentional processes are
sensitive to the success that these relations have, and store information states accordingly.

This notion of propositionality supports a large philosophical canon committed to a tight
syndicate between language and thought. This idea has been thoroughly defended by Jerry
Fodor, who holds that thought must be composed of representational-like vehicles (that is,
propositional structures like those found in language) in order to realize the systematicity
characteristic of reflective cognition (Fodor, 1975; 1983; 1987; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). While
this focus on ‘language as thought’ has been criticized in recent years (Camp, 2007), the
prevailing notion is that higher-order thought – at least in humans – is achieved through language
via propositions and their relations. The sense of propositionality endorsed by the likes of Fodor
and Mandelbaum forges a link between the activity of a mental representation and the operations
of a rule-governed mental schema, such that propositionality is predicated on the functional
capacity of a representation to respond to rational concerns and conform to the laws of logic. But
if one admits that, then we are left to wonder by what standard we are to adjudicate the relative
propositionality of a representation. In other words, if the determinant of propositionality is the
functional capacity to meet certain satisfaction conditions, then what are we to make of those
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representations that display a haphazard sensitivity to such conditions? Admittedly, this is not a
problem for language of thought theorists. After all, one can accept the idea that a representation
has a compositional semantics, in that there is meaning to be discerned from the representation’s
relation with other mental contents, without endorsing the belief that said representation must
scrupulously adhere to the laws of logic.13

But this does pose a problem for philosophers who treat evidence of propositionality as
evidence of a mental state’s being a belief (Smith, 2005, 2012; Egan, 2011). While this inference
is undoubtedly motivated by the ability of beliefs to respond to evidence and interface with other
mental states – indeed, these capacities are exactly what one would expect of a mental
representation that was sensitive to rational demands and normative constraints – evidence of
distinct learning mechanisms and relatively sophisticated associative mental links ought to give
pause to those whose notion of doxasticity is equivalent to rule-governed mental states. The fact
that the central claims of two of the most popular attitude models – APE and PAL – cannot
currently be falsified reinforces the limitations of arguments that use these claims as
justifications for rigid distinctions within the mind. If there are to be hard distinctions, these
divisions must have sound support before we insert epistemic theories and folk psychological
notions of mental phenomena into the uncertainty of attitude research. For this reason, I suggest
using the associative/propositional distinction to refer to the learning mechanisms responsible for
producing attitudes. This articulation allows for somewhat sophisticated interactions amongst
associative states without threatening the perception of propositional states as uniquely situated

13

See the Language of Thought Hypothesis at SEP for more: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/
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to form the basis of higher-order thought, in virtue of their content-responsiveness and
interactive capacities.

There are a few caveats that need mentioning. First, the presence of dual-learning
mechanisms does not imply that there are distinct memory stores for associative and
propositional attitudes. While some have argued for just such a view (Rydell & McConnell,
2006; Smith & Decoster, 2000), findings in favor of distinct memory stores have failed to be
replicated. Moreover, dual-representational views had the least success at predicting the last
thirty years’ worth of EC findings (Corneille & Stahl, 2019).

Second, while I have only provided evidence of two such mechanisms, others have
recently argued that the best explanation for the confusion within EC research, and attitudinal
studies at large, is the presence of multiple learning mechanisms, each with its own operating
principles and conditions (March et al., 2018). Such a view is compatible with a singlerepresentational account of attitudes so long as one posits that all learning mechanisms feed into
the same memory system. In fact, the idea that distinct learning mechanisms share a single
memory system is an integral part of Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2011) associativepropositional model (APE) of attitudes. Though conducive to my aim to portray implicit attitudes
as distinct from beliefs, there is currently only evidence of two such learning mechanisms; as
such, I am formally committed to the more parsimonious dual-mechanism account.

Third, the interaction between associative mental links and top-down processes may at
first seem to substantiate Angela Smith’s claim that implicit attitudes are reflective of an agent’s
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authorial stance. Afterall, a stereotypical unidirectional association, such as the associative
mental link between the concept HISPANIC and the feature HARDWORKING, appears to
reflect a sophisticated appraisal on behalf of an agent. But as we have seen, the relevant factor in
the storage of unidirectional associations is predictive value, which occurs independently of
one’s conscious awareness. Smith’s account seems wedded to the idea that top-down processes
are equivalent with, or subservient to, conscious awareness, but a third experiment performed by
Custer and Aarts challenges such an idea. When participants were given an explicit learning goal
to predict targets based on the primes in the activation phase of the experiment, the resulting
associative mental links were bi-directional rather than unidirectional, leading Custer and Aarts
to conclude that conscious awareness can impede the functional ability of top-down processes to
track and store predictive cues, even when this is the express goal of an agent. If top-down
processes are to be included in the set of mental states that comprise an agent’s authorial stance,
then it appears that by pursuing certain goals we undermine our own agency.

Finally, I conceive of the associative/propositional distinction as tracking the division
between implicit attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, I equate the products of the associative
learning mechanism with implicit attitudes, and the products of the propositional learning
mechanism with explicit attitudes, i.e. beliefs. This characterization forms the basis of what I call
the dual-mechanism theory of implicit bias (henceforth, DMT): the idea that all instances of
implicit bias are attributable to the activation of either an associative attitude (an implicit
attitude) or a propositional attitude (an unconscious belief). Strictly speaking, implicit attitudes
are only associative in nature, however, explicit attitudes operating below conscious awareness
can issue in the same prejudiced behavior. Consequently, only a subset of implicit biases are
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caused by implicit attitudes. The next section introduces a leading theory of consciousness that
justifies the distinction between implicit attitudes and beliefs, and clarifies how explicit attitudes
can remain barred from conscious awareness.

2.3 The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness

The global workspace theory of consciousness (henceforth, GWS) was first proposed by
Bernard Baars (1988). He argued that the mind possesses a common workspace where distinct
and specialized systems can assemble, compare, and communicate information. To occupy the
GWS is for an information state to be occurrently tokened in the mind of an agent. Conscious
mental states are made widely available to a host of different systems, including “…those for
forming memories, for forming new values, for creating affective states, and for reasoning and
decision making…” (Carruthers, 2015, p. 52). Hence, representations occurrently tokened in the
workspace enjoy unparalleled access to information states and diverse cognitive systems.14

Baars used the blackboard model to explain how exchanges of information and decisionmaking unfolds in a largely modularized mind. The blackboard model was originally proposed
by artificial intelligence researchers investigating how domain-general processing can occur in a
system largely composed of specialized processes (Nii, 1986). To make sense of the model, they
proposed the following analogy: consider a room filled with specialists who can only
communicate by writing on a blackboard; only one specialist may use the board at a time, and
they may only share information resulting from their own expertise. When a problem or idea is
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For Levy (2015), it is the widespread connection with other mental states – which allows for greater integration
and refined thought – that makes conscious information the determinant of moral responsibility.

22

introduced, each specialist with something to contribute vies for access to the board where they
may share their findings. Information continues to accrue until the problem is resolved or the
idea concluded.

The GWS model proposes that information only becomes conscious when three
conditions are met (Robinson, 2009). First, incoming information must be represented by
networks of sensory neurons, such as those that make up our perceptual systems, e.g. auditory
and visual neurons. Second, for this representation to reach consciousness it must gain access to
a second stage of processing, requiring the mental state to outcompete other information states.
Third, bottom-up propagation of information and top-down amplification must cohere in such a
way as to cause a general integration of information states across a variety of brain regions.
These areas form an interactive web of cortical space that respond as needed to task demands and
internal information processing. However, not all areas of this cortical space must be active to
‘ignite’ conscious thought – only those required for the task at hand.15 Moreover, the space itself
is designed in such a way that only one conscious representation can be sustained at any given
time (Sergent et al., 2005; Sigman and Dehaene, 2005, 2008).

To see how this works, consider the intense competition that occurs between the outputs
of specialized sensory processes. Relevance and limited attentional resources restrict what
information is broadcast and how frequently it attains entrance to the shared workspace.
Successful entrance can be attributed to bottom-up processing (as when you see a snake-like
figure on the sidewalk) or amplification from top-down processes (when your current concerns

15

I stress this point to avoid accusations that the GWS is a modern declaration of a ‘Cartesian theatre’.
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and goals leap to mind). Thus, not only is pertinent contextual information made readily
available to one’s conscious self, but the things we deem significant (fighting with a spouse,
having an important deadline, wishing to eat healthier) are given priority over less germane ideas
and, as a result, are frequently broadcast within the GWS.

Peter Carruthers has used the GWS to argue for a single-representational dual-attitude
account of implicit bias, which holds that any functional difference between implicit and explicit
attitudes is due to extrinsic relations with other mental items (Carruthers, 2018). According to
this view, all instances of implicit bias are ultimately traceable to the activation of either implicit
cognitive attitudes (propositional structures) or implicit affective states (evaluative structures).16
While the two often align, studies show that the two are dissociable (Amodio & Devine, 2006;
Gilbert et al., 2012) and are stored in different areas of the brain (Phelps et al., 2014). Hence,
someone can have “…a stereotype (even a negative stereotype) about a social group without
having a negative affective attitude toward that group, and vice versa.” (Carruthers, 2018, p. 55).

A stereotypical cognitive attitude can be systematically barred from conscious awareness
for two reasons: either the attitude is continually outcompeted by other mental states vying for
access to the shared workspace, or the attitude is actively inhibited by top-down processes. The
latter is particularly pertinent for doxastic models, since an agent with a vested interest in
avoiding uncomfortable truths about themselves can unwittingly (though willingly) inoculate
themselves to their own attitudes. For example, someone committed to egalitarian values may
nevertheless possess some racial prejudice, but because this belief conflicts with their other
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This work will focus mostly on implicit cognitive attitudes, since implicit affective attitudes are equally
compatible with the dual-learning mechanism view of attitudes.
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deeply cherished beliefs, the underlying attitude might be suppressed to avoid cognitive
dissonance. This suppression does not have to be a conscious effort on the part of the individual,
but can occur via the guiding influence of top-down processes over information states supplied
by bottom-up processes.

Philosophers of race are keenly interested in the ways in which we can isolate ourselves
from unwelcome information, particularly as it concerns certain social facts. Consider Elizabeth
Spelman’s analysis of the willful ignorance of many white Americans in response to g: the idea
that Black America’s grievances are real (Spelman, 2007). According to Spelman, there are two
features that characterize this epistemic state:

1) W does not believe that g is true and does not want to believe that g is true.
2) W does not believe that g is false but wants to believe that g is false.

A person in this state is neutral in regard to the veracity of proposition g, yet their
motivational stance is biased towards g being false. Someone in W’s position avoids even
thinking about the challenges of black Americans – to do otherwise would be to threaten their
cherished epistemic neutrality; such strong motivations could easily kindle the kind of top-down
suppression that bars some attitudes from reaching conscious awareness. Furthermore, this
inability to acknowledge reality forms the basis of what Robin DiAngelo calls ‘White Fragility’,
a state in which “…even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, triggering a
range of defensive moves” (DiAngelo, 2011, p. 54). These defensive moves can be seen in
personal-level behavior, such as blocking certain persons on Facebook, but are also present at the
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subliminal level, as in the kind of early-stage competition that Carruthers states is typical of
information states. Someone in W’s position may possess a stereotypical cognitive or affective
attitude that remains unconscious due to top-down suppression and heavy competition with other
mental states. This inhibition is likely caused by the agent’s need to perpetuate their self-image
and the host of beliefs tied to the falsity – or at least neutrality – of g.

Carruthers’ single-representational dual-attitude view is, in my opinion, the strongest
doxastic account of implicit bias to date. As stated in the last section, I think much of what
implicit measures track are unconscious beliefs; the GWS eloquently demonstrates how attitudes
which would otherwise be ‘explicit’ can remain relegated to the subliminal domain in a
diachronic manner, either they are outcompeted in early-stage information processing or they are
suppressed by top-down processes because they conflict with conscious mental states. Despite its
virtues, this view overlooks a crucial fact about attitudes – they can be associative. As discussed,
associative attitudes can be the reflection of contiguous states of affairs (bi-directional structures)
or the somewhat more sophisticated associative predictive relations of environmental
occurrences (unidirectional structures). Carruthers’ claim that all attitudes are solely
differentiated in virtue of how they relate to other mental contents is undermined by the presence
of an isolable associative learning mechanism. As such, there is a legitimate psychological
distinction between attitudes produced by an associative learning mechanism, which operate
according to little or no satisfaction conditions, and attitudes produced by a propositional
learning mechanism, whose content can possess a range of highly specific relational information.
The presence of dual learning mechanisms suggests that attitudes can vary not only in terms of

26

their relation to other mental contents – an extrinsic fact – but in virtue of their formative history
as well – an intrinsic fact.

2.4 The Implicit/Explicit Distinction According to Dual-Mechanism Theory

Associations can be quite resistant to change. In fact, there are only two ways to alter an
associative mental link: either via counterconditioning (which replaces the former association
with a new one) or extinction (where the mental link dissolves from disuse). This points to a
fundamental difference between propositional and associative attitudes: propositional attitudes
can be sustained in conscious awareness and modified by an agent himself. But the processes
which take associative attitudes as content merely deliver one member of an associative link to
the domain of awareness – the relation itself does not feature in awareness nor can it be modified
directly. To illustrate, consider the associatively evoked image of your grandmother in response
to an airy perfume. While you are free to ruminate on this image, you cannot ruminate on the
association itself. Even if you were made aware of this association (perhaps you took psychology
101) this kind of knowledge is one step removed from the associative link between GRANDMA
and PERFUME which, at heart, is the co-activation of one stimulus response with another, and
does not allow for the kind of rapid update common to beliefs. For instance, if I thought that the
second president of the United States was Thomas Jefferson, and you provide sufficient evidence
that it was most definitely John Adams, I have the ability to change that belief (whether or not I
do is another matter). You, on the other hand, can no more will the association between
PERFUME and GRANDMA to cease than I can will Thomas Jefferson to be the second POTUS.
Any successful modification of this associative link will proceed indirectly, either via
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counterconditioning or extinction, neither of which exhibits the remarkable responsiveness to
counterevidence that typifies doxastic states.

In line with this observation, Grace Helton has recently proposed a moderately revisionary
view of belief that makes conscious modification the mark of a doxastic state (Helton, 2018):

THE REVISABILITY VIEW OF BELIEF (RVB)

Necessarily, if some subject’s mental state that p is a belief and if that subject has sufficiently strong,
undefeated evidence that not-p, then that subject is able to revise that mental state, given her current
psychological mechanisms and skills.

Beliefs are distinguished from other cognitive attitudes (entertained thoughts, pretenses,
non-doxastic delusions) by their capacity to respond to counterevidence and for information to
be updated at the level of conscious awareness. As such, RVB should be seen as articulating a
necessary feature of belief. If a mental state is inherently incapable of entering conscious
awareness, or is characteristically insensitive to relevant information, that state is not a belief. To
be clear, my aim here is not to defend this particular view of belief, but to use conscious
modification to pry apart the conflation of implicit attitudes with unconscious beliefs. Recall the
Reflective/Non-Reflective distinction introduced in section 1:
Non-Reflective
(a) Unconscious
(b) Associatively Structured
(c) Automatically Activated
(d) Not avowed

Reflective
(a1) Conscious
(b1) Propositionally Structured
(c1) Deliberately Controlled
(d1) Avowed

Figure 2. Four distinctive features of dual-process theory (re-visited)
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The Non-Reflective and Reflective columns represent the functional profile of implicit and
explicit attitudes respectively. On the account I have sketched, implicit attitudes are necessarily
unconscious mental states. Bi-directional associations operate in accordance with the Hebbian
principle fire together, wire together, where two concepts can develop an associative mental link
in virtue of frequent co-activity. When either member of the link is perceived, the other is evoked
and is likely to gain access to conscious awareness. While either member of the associative link
can achieve global broadcasting, the link itself cannot enter the global workspace; indeed, I am
not sure what it would even mean for an association, as a mental link, to be consciously
represented. Given that the GWS can only sustain one mental representation at a time, and
associations are, by definition, two or more mental representations linked through habitual coactivation, it seems that global broadcasting of an associative link is a psychological
impossibility given the mental architecture that humans possess.

If associations were encoded with precise relational information, then perhaps they could
be modified indirectly via top-down processes when a member of the associative link was
tokened in conscious awareness (and presented with sufficient counterevidence). But since
associations possess little to no relational information and are only ever represented as a
constituent of a mental link, it is a mystery how conscious awareness could alter the subliminally
acquired and habitually reinforced reflection of a contiguous state of affairs. Unidirectional
associations, being the product of interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes, are
associative links encoded with predictive relational information. While more sophisticated than
bi-directional associations, these mental states are also immune to conscious modification since

29

the associative mental link, being a co-activation between mental states, cannot enter the shared
workspace, with its entry limitations.17

Because implicit attitudes are associations, and associations operate via automatic
processes, we should expect subjects to reveal certain attitudes besides those they consciously
avow when operating under time-constraints or cognitive strain. And this is precisely what
implicit measures report. Though implicit and explicit attitudes often coincide, the two can
diverge – a fact made possible by the diachronic and subliminal nature of associative formation.
Moreover, the rapid social change that has characterized the last fifty years of American history
– which has moved from debates over busing in the 1970’s (a recent hot topic) to the swearing in
of America’s first African American president – presents the perfect context for tension between
those attitudes deemed socially acceptable and those that are not. Indeed, the residue of our
nation’s unsavory past can be traced to the automatic responses of everyday individuals, whose
repeated exposure to stereotypical images, rhetoric, and ideas, usher implicit attitudes through
the backdoor of our mental life.

Explicit attitudes, on the other hand, are the products of a propositional learning
mechanism, and despite the name, are not always made explicit to those who have them. When
propositional attitudes are produced, top-down processes store precise information governing the
relation between their relata in memory, allowing these mental states to operate in a systematic

17

The claim that associative links can be consciously represented is best understood as a category mistake. Although
agents can reflect on associatively evoked mental states, and even ponder the relation between those representations,
associative links are never consciously broadcast, i.e. they do not feature in awareness with their semantic content.
Propositional attitudes are inseparable from their semantic information, and since they are stored with specific
relational information, are easily updated at the level of conscious awareness – a feat simply not possible for
associative links, which are merely the inward representation of an external regularity.
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manner with other mental contents. The reason I cannot pay you to believe the sky is green is
that too many of your other beliefs state otherwise; given the inclination of beliefs to abide by
normative constraints – a byproduct of their specific content and connections with other mental
states – the only way to change a belief is by influencing those around it, or by presenting
evidence which appeals to the content of the target belief. Moreover, given the fact that
propositional attitudes have been shown to feature in both automatic and deliberate processes
(De Houwer, 2014), (c1) should be read as a capacity of explicit attitudes, not a limitation. Since
propositional attitudes are not constituents of a mental link predicated on co-activity with other
mental states, they and their semantic content can be accurately represented in conscious
awareness. The specificity and availability of this content allow for the rapid updating of beliefs
and the storage of these updates in memory via top-down processes. Finally, because
inconsistent explicit attitudes result in cognitive dissonance, there is internal pressure for an
agent to align their beliefs into a congruent whole, culminating in remarkably consistent –
though ultimately imperfect – coalitions of diverse information states.

This last fact is plainly demonstrated by David Lewis, who articulates how even conscious
beliefs can fall short of flawless integration:
“I used to think that Nassau Street ran roughly east-west; that the railroad nearby ran
roughly north-south; and that the two were roughly parallel… So each sentence in an
inconsistent triple was true according to my beliefs, but not everything was true
according to my beliefs.” (Lewis, 1982, p. 436).
The fact that Lewis failed to notice the inconsistency between three of his beliefs – beliefs
used on other occasions to justify or inform behavior – points to the fact that even conscious
attitudes can fail to interact with other mental states in an optimal manner. Note, however, that
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this limitation is not due to anything inherent to the attitude itself, but is instead a consequence of
the attitude’s extrinsic relations with other mental contents. It is safe to say then, that perfect
inferential promiscuity is not required for an attitude to be a belief so long as these systematic
limitations can be attributed to extrinsic circumstances; otherwise, a host of mental items we
normally take to be paradigmatic doxastic states, such as those held by Lewis, would not be
considered beliefs.

The next section uses DMT to explain some of the most influential studies within implicit
attitude research. As we will see, the presence of two separate learning mechanisms best explains
why some unconscious attitudes are somewhat responsive to evidence and other mental states,
while also allowing for the kind of incremental attitude change evinced by classical conditioning.

Section 3. The Dual-Mechanism Theory of Implicit Bias

Philosophers and psychologists tend to characterize implicit attitudes as a uniform kind.
Examples include: low-level associations (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011), behavioral dispositions (Schwitzgebel, 2010; 2013), patchy endorsements
(Levy, 2015), character traits (Machery, 2016), unconscious beliefs (Mandelbaum, 2015;
Carruthers, 2018), and even unconscious imaginings (Sullivan-Bissett, 2018). Each of these
views assumes that implicit attitudes are either a homogenous class of mental items composed of
a similar structure and functional profile, or a uniform set of behaviors (Holroyd & Sweetman,
2016). But reconciling a unified account of implicit attitudes with the tumultuous state of affairs
within attitude research has had fair-to-middling success, prompting some to toy with the idea
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that implicit attitudes may constitute a homeostatic-property cluster (Stammers, 2018). The
purpose of this section is to clarify the ambiguous nature of implicit attitudes encouraged by
seemingly contradictory empirical findings. In doing so, I defend the idea that veritable implicit
attitudes are a uniform category composed of low-level associations, but that much of what
implicit measures track are propositionally structured unconscious beliefs.

I begin by examining two studies that suggest implicit attitudes are capable of much more
than what associative accounts predict. These studies form the basis of Mandelbaum (2015) and
Carruthers’ (2018) doxastic theories of implicit bias, and have much to offer in the way of
articulating the operation of unconscious beliefs. After examining these studies through the lens
of DMT, I transition to three studies that suggest implicit attitudes are only mildly responsive to
other mental states and largely oblivious to the logical implications of their subject matter. Neil
Levy (2015) uses these studies to advance the position that implicit attitudes are a sui generis
class of mental states, somewhere between mere associations and bona fide beliefs in terms of
content-responsiveness and inferential capacity (Levy, 2015). After responding to these
concerns, I close by reviewing the state of associative research and its effect on implicit attitude
studies.

3.1 The Case for Unconscious Belief

Our first study examines the role of cognitive balance theory in the construction of
interpersonal attitudes (Gawronski et al., 2005). One of the basic suppositions in Fritz Heider’s
(1958) balance theory is that there tends to be a consistency in the triadic relationships that
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represent our affective responses. For example, if P1 likes P2, and if P2 likes object X, then P1 is
more apt to like X as well. Gawronski and colleagues wanted to test whether the predictions of
balance theory would hold when applied to the operation of implicit attitudes within a social
context. They began by presenting participants with an unfamiliar photo – CS1. Subjects were
exposed to repeated pairings of the photo with positively or negatively valanced words, until
subjects developed a corresponding bias towards CS1. Once instilled, subjects were exposed to a
new photo – CS2 – and told that CS1 either liked or disliked CS2. To conclude the test, subjects
were given an affective priming task that tracked their implicit reactions towards both photos.

As balance theory predicts, subjects were more likely to have positively valanced
responses to CS2 when they were conditioned to like CS1. In other words, the positive affect
originally directed to CS1 was extended to CS2. This bodes well for AIB, which holds that
associations between concepts and things can accord with affective transference – one positive
plus another positive can result in a further, additional positive. But when subjects were
conditioned to respond negatively to CS1, and subsequently told that CS1 disliked CS2, subjects
demonstrated a positive implicit bias towards CS2 – the exact opposite of what balance theory
(and AIB for that matter) predicts. This case demonstrates how two negative affections – one
directed at CS1 and the other produced by CS1 disliking CS2 – can result in a third, positive
affective response. Associative accounts of implicit bias cannot explain how an automatic and
classically conditioned attitude can operate in accordance with rudimentary logic, i.e. a double
negative. As Mandelbaum describes it, this experiment suggests that subjects are making an
inference akin to the proverbial saying the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The inferential
capacities of unconscious processes should not be surprising in and of themselves, after all, they
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form an integral part of modular theories of the mind (Fodor, 1983; 2000). Yet, given the
supposition that implicit attitudes are purely associative, the accuracy with which they track the
semantic contents of propositional structures provides a strong reason to think that the
functionality of implicit attitudes extends beyond mere contiguous relations between concepts.

The second study reveals that mere mental ruminations can produce implicit biases in
equal strength to those generated by classical conditioning. Gregg et al. (2006) devised a test to
evaluate if DPT could account for any differences, should they arise, between ‘concrete’ versus
‘abstract’ learning styles and the acquisition of implicit attitudes. They define concrete learning
as “the act of cognitively assimilating multiple pieces of information about the characteristics of
an object or, alternatively, of assimilating the same piece of information multiple times” and
abstract learning as “hypothetically assuming that an object possesses particular characteristics”
(Gregg et al., 2006, p. 4).

In experiment one of their four-part study, participants were divided into two groups: a
‘concrete learning’ group and an ‘abstract learning’ group and asked to evaluate two hypothetical
tribes – the Luupites and Niffites. Participants in the concrete condition underwent 240 rounds of
classical conditioning, in which positive valence words were paired with the Luupites, and
negatively valanced words were paired with the Niffites. The abstract condition was merely
asked to imagine the two tribes, one of which (the Luupites) was peaceful and civilized, and the
other (the Niffites) barbarous and brutal. Each group was then asked to take an IAT to see if any
implicit biases had developed, and if so, to evaluate their relative strength. Lo and behold, both
the concrete and abstract learning groups had incurred an implicit bias towards the Niffite tribe,
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and what is more, the relative strength was roughly equal across the two groups. The fact that a
single instance of abstract thinking elicited the same level of implicit bias as a paradigm example
of sustained associative conditioning is startling. Proponents of AIB are hard pressed to explain
how a single imaginary episode can produce the same level of implicit bias as 240 rounds of
classical conditioning; doxastic accounts, on the other hand, have a ready answer “all groups
formed the same (strong) belief that Niffites were bad while Luupites were good” (Mandelbaum,
2015, p. 16).

According to DMT, the underlying attitude in each study was an unconscious belief, not
an implicit attitude. The inferential ability evinced by attitudes in the first study should only be
possible if the underlying mental state possessed a propositional structure, which, according to
DMT, indicates that an attitude was encoded with specific relational information. Because this
specificity is found only in attitudes produced by a propositional mechanism, doxastic theories
are right to deduce the underlying mental state is an unconscious belief. Having precise relational
information enables a mental state to efficaciously feature in inferences and other such
computational processes. While it may be possible for an attitude with haphazard relational
information, like a unidirectional association, to feature in an inference, the lack of specificity
would undermine the accuracy of any process which took such an attitude as content. Therefore,
given that the accuracy of the attitudes in Gawronski and colleague’s (2005) study was high, it is
best to interpret this study as tracking the inferential capacity of unconscious beliefs, not implicit
attitudes.
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The second study is a perfect example of one of the central claims of PAL: that
propositional attitudes can be formed on the fly and stored in memory thanks to the guiding hand
of top-down processes. When an agent is asked to consciously represent the relation between
some tribe (the Niffites) and some feature (barbarous) they understand this information via the
evaluation of propositional structures; the ensuing imaginary episode triggers top-down
processes to store the information for future use, whose activation is subsequently detected when
participants take an IAT. Traditional IAT’s are designed to track disparities in a subject’s
response times between stereotypical and non-stereotypical information – a measurement that
cannot distinguish between automatically activated associations (implicit attitudes) and
automatically activated propositions (explicit attitudes). Since propositionally structured
information can feature in both automatic and deliberate processes, it is probable that what this
experiment demonstrates is not the spontaneous formation of implicit attitudes, but the
precipitous formation and subsequent effect of unconscious beliefs on personal-level behavior.

3.2 Evidence for a Sui Generis Mental State

There are three studies that challenge my claim that implicit attitudes are purely
associative mental states and that much of what implicit measures track are unconscious beliefs.
The first study questions the ability of implicit attitudes to feature in inferences with any degree
of accuracy, and by extension, illustrates a remarkable lack of content-responsiveness to other
mental states. Rozin and colleagues (1986, 1990) tested the ability of attitudes to ‘bind’ to certain
objects in a way that influenced personal-level behavior despite a subject’s consciously held
beliefs. The experiment unfolds as follows:
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“Subjects faced two empty brown 500 ml bottles. In the presence of the subject,
the experimenter opened a container of “Domino” cane sugar, and poured some
into each bottle, so that about ¼ of each bottle was filled. The experimenter
informed subjects that she was pouring sugar into each bottle. The experimenter
then presented the subject with two typed labels. One had not ‘sodium cyanide’,
not poison written on it, with a red skull and cross bones preceded by the word
‘not’. The other label had ‘sucrose, table sugar’ typed on it. The subject was
invited to put one label on each bottle, in any way he or she chose. The
experimenter then set out two different colored plastic cups, one in front of each
bottle, and poured unsweetened red (tropical punch) ‘Kool-Aid’ from a glass
pitcher into both, until they were about half full. Now, using separate, new plastic
spoons for each bottle, the experimenter put a half spoonful of powder from one
sugar bottle into the glass standing in front of that bottle, and repeated this with
the other glass for the other sugar bottle.”18
According to Mandelbaum, associative accounts of implicit bias cannot explain how the
general apprehension of subjects in this experiment ‘binds’ to one bottle, as opposed to any other
object or merely subsisting in general (Mandelbaum, 2013). Instead, he posits that a person
forms an unconscious belief that takes the ‘poison’ jar as its subject. What might such a belief
look like? He offers the following candidate: “THAT IS DANGEROUS CYANIDE, SO AVOID IT” as
well as the following inferential pattern “THAT BOTTLE CONTAINS POISON, PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE
DRINKING POISON, SO PEOPLE WILL NOT LIKE DRINKING FROM THAT BOTTLE” (Mandelbaum,

2013, p.204). But as Neil Levy points out, what is remarkable about this experiment is not that
the underlying attitude transpired in an inference, but that the inference was blind to the semantic
content of the second jar’s label – not sodium cyanide, not poison (Levy, 2015). Hence, while it
appears that some unconscious attitudes are content-responsive and may feature in inferences,
the degree to which they accord with reason and rational constraints is far less than that of
conscious beliefs.

18

Rozin et al 1990, op cit.
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Besides tracking logical relations, beliefs ought to be able to update accordingly when
presented with new information. In our second study, Han and colleagues’ (2006) tested to see
whether ‘extrapersonal associations’, such as peer evaluations, might have an effect on implicit
attitudes. First, children were taught facts about the card game Pokémon, specifically, which
cards were better for someone who wanted to win the game. Next, they were exposed to a video
in which two other children expressed opposing opinions about which cards were best. While
subjects rejected the opinions of the children in the video (since they conflicted with their aim to
win the game) a subsequent IAT revealed a change in subjects’ implicit attitudes. Although the
children expressed preferences for the objectively better cards, the opinions of their ‘peers’ was
enough to modify their implicit responses in favor of the cards preferred by the children in the
video. The control group, which was not shown the video, did not exhibit any discord between
their implicit and explicit responses. Hence, some unconscious attitudes update when they should
not, demonstrating an illicit sensitivity that one would not expect of beliefs or belief-like states,
which are prone to operate under normative constraints.

Conversely, there is evidence to suggest that implicit attitudes fail to update when they
should. Recall the findings of Gregg et al. (2006), which used two fictional tribes to test how
learning measures effect the inculcation of implicit biases. After establishing that abstract
supposition could create implicit attitudes just as effectively as prolonged associations, Gregg
and colleagues tested to see if the bias could be undone or altered by new information. In
experiment three, they informed participants who had already inculcated a bias that there had
been a mistake and that the Luupites were actually barbarous and brutal while the Niffites were
peaceful and civilized. The results found that while the self-reported preferences of subjects
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updated in light of the new information, their automatic responses remained the same; in other
words, subjects’ implicit biases continued to guide their behavior despite their being aware that
the two groups had ‘mistakenly’ been mixed up. Once set, the content of an implicit bias does
not appear very receptive to further information, even if the original acquisition of said bias was
caused by a single imaginary episode.

Together, these studies suggest that implicit attitudes have a broader functional profile
than mere associations, but fall far short of the inferential promiscuity and contentresponsiveness indicative of doxastic states. In what follows, I argue that the underlying
attitudes in the above three studies are actually unconscious beliefs, and defend the view that
implicit attitudes are purely associative in nature.

3.3 Against a Sui Generis Account

Critiques of doxastic theories threaten the functional account of inhibited explicit
attitudes and their corresponding effects on behavior I portrayed in section 2.4. Therefore, it is
necessary to show in what way the above studies are compatible with the tenets of DMT.

The findings of Rozin et al. (1986;1990) challenge associative and doxastic accounts by
presenting a mental state with lackluster content-responsiveness and inferential promiscuity –
which is beyond the operative abilities of associative mental states and below that of beliefs –
prompting Levy to claim that implicit attitudes are ‘patchy’ endorsements of sorts. But DMT can
explain these instances without postulating an additional mental entity. Recall the claim of
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propositional theorists (De Houwer et al., 2009; Michael et al., 2009) that propositions can
encode a variety of relational information, including that of mere co-occurrences; in fact, this is
why they contend there are no associations, in the normal sense of the word, whatsoever. If the
specific relational information of a propositional attitude encodes a co-occurrence, then the
operation of that attitude will be indistinguishable from that of a pure association, despite that
attitude having the capacity to update at the level of conscious awareness, given its being the
product of a propositional learning mechanism. Since the participants of these studies were
consciously aware of the propositional information presented to them (indeed, they played a part
in setting up the experiment) it is possible they formed a propositional attitude encapsulating an
associative relation between the bottle (object) and the affect-laden label (poison). Propositions,
as the representational-vehicles of systematic thought, have no trouble featuring in inferences;
nevertheless, a proposition whose relation was that of a co-occurrence would suffer in terms of
accuracy in the same way that any process which took a representation with limited relational
information as content would be prone to imprecise calculations. Hence, an insensitivity to the
logical implications of the propositionally represented ‘not’ is precisely what one would expect
of a propositional attitude with the semantic content of a bi-directional association.

The second study presents a case where an unconscious attitude updates in response to
non-relevant information (opinion) and conflicts with the subject’s conscious goals (to win the
card game). This receptivity should not be possible for an associative mental state, which can
only change via counter-conditioning or extinction, and challenges doxastic accounts on the
grounds that beliefs are reliably content-responsive, responding to other information-states as
reason warrants. For Levy, this is evidence of a unique class of mental items with a degree of
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inferential promiscuity and content-responsiveness somewhere between associations and bona
fide beliefs. But the GWS, which Levy is intimately acquainted with, allows for another
interpretation.19 Recall that our current concerns and goals have a differential effect on which
information states achieve global-broadcasting. While a representation may have the ability to
enter conscious awareness, it can remain confined to the subliminal domain due to early-stage
competition between information states or from top-down suppression. As Carruthers notes, topdown processes often monitor access to the shared workspace in accordance with social norms; if
a word or action could cause lasting harm to one’s reputation (as a sexist or homophobic remark
might) then top-down processes are likely to suppress that representation in favor of other, more
anodyne mental states. So, too, can a mental state be barred from conscious awareness if it
provokes cognitive dissonance, as evinced by cases of ‘willful ignorance’ and ‘white fragility’.
Similarly, subjects in the Han and colleagues’ (2006) study could have formed the unconscious
belief that the objectively worse cards were in some way desirable or useful in response to the
opinions of their ‘peers’. Because this attitude is in contention with the express beliefs of
participants, it would normally be suppressed in day-to-day affairs; however, the time constraints
imposed by traditional IAT’s allow such attitudes to manifest in the automatic responses of
participants, thereby bypassing the inhibition of any top-down forces that might be in effect.

Finally, the third study presents evidence that once formed, unconscious attitudes can be
surprisingly resistant to counter-evidence, even if the attitude is the recent product of a single
imaginary episode. Although the explicit attitudes of participants updated in response to the news

19

Neil Levy (2014) has used the GWS theory of consciousness to support a view of moral responsibility that relies
on the consciousness condition, which states that we only exert the requisite self-control over the moral significance
of our actions when we are consciously aware of their moral character.
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that the two fictitious tribes had been mixed-up, their implicit attitudes remained the same. How
can DMT, which postulates that the underlying attitude is either an associative or propositional
mental state, accommodate these findings? The answer lies within our affective mechanisms. As
Carruthers notes, if we assume that top-down processes can quickly store appraisals of novel
objects in one’s valuational mechanisms, and that once set, these appraisals can only be altered
through slow incremental change, then the findings of Gregg and colleagues (2006) can be
accommodated by a doxastic – or dual-mechanism – view. Indeed, some studies suggest that
preferences resulting from imagination can last for over three years (Sharot et al., 2012). Because
the affective status of objects we encounter are unlikely to change quickly – a poisonous food
will remain poisonous, lions will continue to be a threat, and so on – it makes sense that our
valuational systems would be receptive to new information but resistant to wanton change.

To close, each of the studies cited by Levy to suggest that implicit attitudes are a unique
mental state, separate from associations and beliefs, can be addressed by DMT. However, the
gist of my arguments against the ‘patchy’ endorsement theorist is compatible with doxastic
accounts, namely those of Mandelbaum (2015) and Carruthers (2018). As such, it is only proper
to explain why implicit attitudes ought to be equated with associative mental states when so
much of what implicit measures track can be elucidated by appealing to unconscious beliefs.

Section 4. Implicit Attitudes and the Resurgence of Associative Research

The success of propositional models has encouraged skepticism towards associative
attitude research (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Newell & Shanks, 2014), prompting a renewed
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effort to understand the relationship between conscious awareness and attitude formation. De
Houwer’s (2009) propositional account of attitude learning (PAL) has been quite effective at
casting doubt on associative theories of attitudes, and has gained increasing support in virtue of
its parsimonious endorsement of a single-process architecture and a solitary learning mechanism.
Nevertheless, the findings of Custers and Aarts (2011) provide striking evidence of an isolable
associative learning mechanism, leading De Houwer to conclude that there are most likely two
distinct learning mechanisms responsible for the production of attitudes within the human mind.
While I suggested that doxastic accounts of implicit bias have much to gain from incorporating
the empirical evidence of PAL, any theory which ignores evidence of associative attitudes risks
selectively endorsing evidence and enforcing an unwarranted distinction between human beings
and the rest of the animal kingdom.

To clarify, in his discussion on animal cognition, De Houwer (forthcoming) notes that
associative processes probably emerged fairly early in evolutionary history, with propositional
processes developing much later. Once an organism developed a propositional learning
mechanism, the need for a similar associative process would be moot, leading to the eventual
rewiring of associative mental processes for other cognitive purposes. While De Houwer frames
this fact in an inclusive manner, noting that many non-human animals are likely to possess
propositional learning mechanisms and simple propositionally-structured thoughts (a fact I agree
with), this nevertheless casts homo sapiens as a sui generis species, unique among the animal
kingdom in our possession of a purely propositional mental format. Instead, it is much more
likely that we, like many other animals, can form associations in response to our environment
that are not propositionally structured. After all, classical conditioning has demonstrated that
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animals can form associative links composed of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and a conditioned
response (CR) (Pavlov, 1897). In fact, classical conditioning has been successfully forged in
such diverse animal species as: honey bees, (Bitterman et al., 1983), marine mollusks (Hawkins
& Byrne, 2015), snails (Takigami et al., 2015) and fish (Barretto et al., 2018). The mental
architecture of these animals varies in many ways, but each species is nevertheless capable of
forming associations strong enough to influence their behavioral patterns in response to
contextual regularities. Moreover, although the field of animal cognition has yet to conclude
whether animals can possess beliefs, the fact remains that a myriad of species can form
associative links between salient stimuli, meaning it is conceptually possible for an associative
link to exist irrespective of a doxastic attitude or a mental architecture capable of sustaining
belief-like representations.20 Therefore, to conclude that human cognition is solely composed of
propositionally structured mental representations, and that these representations can account for
all instances of associative behavior, is a daring presumption indeed.

Nevertheless, there are valid critiques to some of the designs that support associative
attitudes. One of the strongest critics of implicit learning and the presence of distinct learning
mechanisms comes from Shanks and Stjohn (1994), who identify four criteria that must be met
to adequately demonstrate unconscious learning of supraliminal cues: 1) the sensitivity criterion
requires appropriate sensitivity of the measures of awareness (to avoid conscious contamination),
2) the information criterion suggests that the measure of awareness and the experimental task

20

Proponents of the ‘language as thought’ thesis affirm that doxastic states require a representational basis grounded
in a propositional structure; consequently, animals with such a structure can properly be said to possess beliefs
(Fodor, 1975; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Others claim that animals possess beliefs by extending the representational
format of doxastic states to include non-propositional structures, such as imagistic thought (Camp, 2009; Rescorla,
2009).
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should probe the same information (to avoid conflating variables), 3) the immediacy criterion
states that testing should immediately follow the experimental task (to enhance target detection),
and 4) the relevance criterion advises that the measure of awareness should ignore irrelevant
information (to avoid tracking unrelated phenomena). Alamia and colleagues (2016) tested to see
whether subliminal associative learning could occur under these stringent requirements. In their
experiment, participants were asked to report the motion direction of a colored patch of dots.
They were not told, however, that of the three colors the dots could take, two of them were
associated with motion direction. Hence, there was a predictive relation between the color of a
dot and the direction in which it was oriented. Besides adhering to the four criteria, the study also
asked participants a series of questions to see if any of the participants might have become aware
of the relation during the experiment. Despite this maneuver, it is always possible that
participants tangentially noticed the relation but failed to recall it when queried, meaning their
top-down resources could have stored the information for future use. To avoid such a case, the
final portion of the experiment informed participants of the predictive relation and then had them
take an additional test. If participants had become aware of the relation, there would have been
little discrepancy in their first and second scores; but if they were not aware of the relation, then
one would expect their performance to improve the second time around.

The results found that most participants remained unaware of the association between
color and motion direction, yet still acquired the predictive relation between the two stimuli. For
the majority of participants, scores increased on the final test, suggesting that their increased
performance before learning the rule was the result of a subliminal association predicated on
predictive accuracy. Because this study conforms to the four criteria, it is not immune to the
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same objections that plague traditional associative studies, such as conscious contamination and
conflation of observed phenomena. Indeed, as Alamia and colleagues put it “We believe that our
study provides the first demonstration of unconscious learning of simple associations…”
(Alamia et al., 2016).

Section 5. Conclusion

Using the most stringent procedures, recent research has established the presence of a
distinct associative learning mechanism (Custers & Aarts, 2011), that associations can form
subliminally (Alamia et al., 2016; 2018) and that dual-process models which posit multiple
learning mechanisms can best explain instances like the Perruchet effect, where conscious
expectations and associative mental links dissociate in regard to performance ability
(Destrebecqz, 2018). Together, these findings support associative views of implicit bias which
postulate that: 1) implicit attitudes are low-level associations between mental states, 2) that
associations can form outside of conscious awareness and in opposition to the expressed beliefs
of an agent, and 3) that associations can only change via counter-conditioning or extinction.

The purpose of this work has been to defend the claim that implicit attitudes are purely
associative in nature and to illustrate how much of what implicit measures track are actually
unconscious beliefs. The findings of Gregg and colleagues (2006) provide an excellent
illustration of how two such attitudes might arise: implicit attitudes are associative structures
produced in response to contextual regularities (such as 240 rounds of classical conditioning),
while explicit attitudes are the result of a propositional mechanism which operates in conjunction
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with conscious awareness (such as imaginary episodes). Critics of the dual-mechanism approach
may note that I have not cited a specific study showing an associatively produced implicit
attitude distinct from a non-broadcasted explicit attitude. This is no accident. As the
psychologists at the forefront of the attitude debate note (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2018; De
Houwer, forthcoming) there is currently no definitive method of discerning an associatively
linked attitude from a propositional structure encoding a mere co-occurrence. Hence, evidence
for one or the other will have to rely on indirect cues, such as how the attitude responds to
relevant counter-evidence and other mental states. As DMT predicts, true-blue implicit attitudes
ought to be utterly insensitive to logical relations and mental contents beyond their associative
link. To verify these claims, one would need to produce a stereotypical attitude via classical or
evaluative conditioning in the absence of awareness. Since actual stereotypes would be
recognized and presumably stored somewhere in an agent’s memory, the experiment would have
to create fictitious social groups, akin to Gregg and colleagues’ (2006) study; however, it would
be necessary to consciously mask the relation between a concept (Social Group A) and some
feature (Good/Bad). In other words, one would have to occupy conscious awareness in an
attempt to keep an agent from noticing the predictive relation between some social group and a
particular feature, which is not a hard thing to do, as evinced by Custer and Aarts (2011) and
Alamia and colleagues (2016).

To close, there are two ways we can characterize implicit attitudes. First, we can consider
any underlying mental state which issues in a biased or prejudiced action as a member of the
class of implicit attitudes. Such a construal remains agnostic towards specific claims regarding
the structure and functional profile that an individual attitude has, which, given the widespread
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disagreement in the field, might be a good tactic if one’s primary objective is to address the
problems of implicitly biased behavior. A second approach, and the one that I favor, is that we
distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes in virtue of their formative history, which has a
differential impact on their respective functional profiles. Being the product of an associative
learning mechanism endows an attitude with features a…d, while attitudes generated from a
propositional mechanism have characteristics a1…d1. This distinction provides new perspectives
on old findings (heuristic value), effectively preserving the traditional depiction of implicit
attitudes as purely associative mental states, while also generating new predictions (predictive
value), by articulating the factors under which an explicit attitude can remain unconscious while
influencing agent-level behavior. Although ultimately a terminological dispute, efforts to
eradicate implicit social biases can only gain from an accurate understanding of the mental states
which produce them. Prejudiced actions resulting from an implicit attitude are best combatted by
counter-conditioning of the underlying associative link, or extinguishing it altogether.
Unconscious beliefs, on the other hand, can be consciously addressed only if the obstacles
preventing their broadcasting are removed. Sometimes these obstacles are self-imposed, as when
an individual actively avoids reflecting on certain issues, or it can occur unwittingly, via the
subliminal activity of one’s top-down processes. Specifying the interaction between top-down
processes and conscious thought presents a challenge for contemporary discussions of moral
agency and moral responsibility – topics which dual-mechanism theory can help illuminate.
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